Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) suffer from many security attacks when deployed either in remote or hostile environments. Among possible attacks, the Sybil attack is one of the severe attacks in which malicious nodes report false identities and location information such that the remaining nodes believe that many nodes exist in their vicinity. The current study proposes a method for detecting Sybil attack using sequential analysis. This method works in two stages. First, it collects the evidences by observing neighboring node activities. Further, the collected evidences are consolidated to provide input to the second stage. In the second stage, collected evidences are validated using the sequential probability ratio test to decide whether the neighbor node is Sybil or benign. The proposed method has been evaluated using the network simulator ns-2. Simulation results show that the proposed method is robust in detecting Sybil attacks with very low false positive and false negative rates.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of many low-cost and tiny sensing and communication devices (also called as nodes) configured with limited memory, processing capability and energy resource [1] . These nodes are often deployed in remote and hostile environments to perform mission critical tasks. In such environments, an adversary can physically capture and tamper the nodes such that the tampered node distorts the network operations by launching various security attacks. Among possible attacks, the Sybil attack is a severe attack in which a compromised node sends out false identity and/or location information such that the remaining nodes believe that many nodes exist in their vicinity. A compromised node can launch the Sybil attack using stolen or fabricated identities and/or location information.
An attacker may launch Sybil attacks in three ways as follows [2, 3, 31] 1) During the direct or indirect communication with the malicious nodes.
2) using fabricated or stolen information. During fabrication, an attacker generates arbitrarily new identities or location data. Whereas, with stolen information an attacker assigns valid identity or location data to a compromised node.
3) A malicious node could attack simultaneously by sending out all fabricated identities or non-simultaneously by sending out each false identity at a time.
Since node identities and location data are vital to the network operations such as routing, data aggregation, clustering, cluster head election, distributed storage, resource allocation, and others [2] , the network performance degrades substantially if Sybil attacks are present in the network.
There exist several promising applications of WSNs such as monitoring and control of industrial equipment, home automation, patient monitoring, environmental monitoring, climate change monitoring, detecting hazardous chemical levels, combat field surveillance, remotely detecting or controlling landmines, intrusion detection, criminal hunting, and others [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . These applications need the node identity and location information to process the sensor data at the destination. The advantages of such applications can be fully utilized only if nodes report the correct identity and location data.
To this end, the Sybil attack has been widely studied by the researchers and proposed a number of methods in the literature . However, existing methods require costly requirements such as relay nodes placement [9] , directional antennas [10] , cryptography methods [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 42] , etc.
However, these methods increase overhead and not suitable for the resource-limited sensor nodes. Therefore, a simple and efficient method is required for resource constrained WSNs to detect Sybil attacks without additional overhead. To this end, the current study presents a nodecentric method for Sybil Attack Detection using Sequential Analysis (SADSA). The SADSA method works in two phases: evidence collection and evidence validation. In the existing literature, nodes in a network are categorized into benign or malicious based on certain parameters (or evidences). These evidences could be message authentication [11] , random passwords [12] , signal strength [16, 26] , Time Difference of Arrival (TODA) [17] , location verification [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , trust values [23] , identifying common neighbors [25, 26] , energy and hop count [28] , traffic monitoring [29] , signal print [30] , and others. By having the evidences, Sybil attack detection methods analyze and classify the malicious nodes from benign nodes. To this end, similar treatment has been considered for the proposed SADSA method. In the first stage, nodes consider location data of neighbors, Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and timestamp of the messages received from neighbors as evidences. The collected evidences are consolidated to provide inputs to the second phase. In the second phase, the consolidated evidences are validated using the sequential probability ratio test to determine whether the neighbor node is benign or Sybil. In this way, these two phases are repeated for each evidence throughout the network operation. The advantage of the proposed method is that it does not require special hardware, heavy communication process, heavy computation, and high memory requirements as the nodes obtain RSS of messages without any additional hardware requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related works on Sybil attack detection. Section III presents the preliminaries, system model, and assumptions considered for SADSA method. Section IV describes the proposed SADSA method. Section V presents the performance evaluation of the SADSA method using a simulation study. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with the future scope.
II.
RELATED WORK Douceur et al. [32] first coined the term Sybil attacks in the realm of network security. The authors defined the Sybil attack in a peer-to-peer network as damaging nodes' reputation by duplicating their identities. In another study, Abu-Ghazaleh et al. [33] studied that reporting false [25] proposed a method to detect Sybil attacks using two-hop messages. It is an extension of Ssu et al.
[24] method. However, this method also suffers from high communication overhead like DSANI method. Vasudeva et al. [35] proposed a method to detect Sybil attacks on lowest identity-based clustering algorithms. In these algorithms, a node with the lowest identity is selected as the cluster head for processing the data. In this work, the malicious nodes disrupt the cluster formation process by sending out low identity numbers. Nodes running this method detect malicious activities by validating each neighbor's information. Like Ssu et al. [24] method, this method collects the neighbors information by varying the transmission range.
Golestani et al. [29] proposed a Sybil attack detection method to improve the security of WSNs for smart grids. This method works by analyzing the traffic on the network. It assumes that the traffic density will be more around the Sybil nodes. Each node observes the traffic density in its vicinity and detects the malicious nodes by analyzing the traffic using k-means clustering and averaging methods.
Li et al. [27] proposed Regional Statistics Detection (RSD) method for identifying Sybil attacks.
It is a distributed detection algorithm. This method uses RSSI of messages to detect the Sybil identities. The detection process has three steps. In the first step, nodes record the RSSI of the messages received from their neighbors. Each node enters this record into its RSSI-ID Bin et al. [34] proposed Sybil attack detection methods based on communication ranging in WSNs. These methods work with the help of anchor nodes. These methods assume that malicious nodes perform the Sybil attack from a fixed location in the network. When a node receives the beacon message from its neighbors, it calculates the polar distance by measuring the polar angle. A Sybil attack is detected when the polar distance of different nodes is less than a threshold value. However, this method requires additional hardware setup such as anchor nodes.
From the aforementioned literature, it is observed that each method its own strengths and limitations. Most of the methods are based on conventional cryptography, use of additional hardware setup such as anchor nodes, and having heavy communication process. In general, nodes have to execute the attack detection methods in conjunction with the application protocols.
To this end, a node-centric approach is required to detect the Sybil attacks efficiently without additional overheads.
III. PRELIMINARIES, SYSTEM MODEL, AND ASSUMPTIONS a. Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is a statistical hypothesis testing method that was developed by Wald [38] . Unlike conventional hypothesis testing, SPRT works without having
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fixed sample size. It has become a promising testing method to detect defective items in manufacturing industries. A detailed survey on SPRT applications can be found in [39] [40] [41] .
SPRT is modeled as a random walk with a lower and upper bound. In this random walk, the decision-making process will start at a point in the two bounds and move towards any of the two  Each node has a fixed communication range R.
 An adversary can compromise nodes in the network with a certain probability.
 Each node has a unique identity.
 Each node is aware of its location information. For example, the CC2431 system-on-chip solution based on the IEEE 802.15.4 specification is popular for obtaining location information. This chip has the advantage of CC2420 transceiver and location detection module [44, 45] .
 Each node periodically broadcast a beacon message consists of its identity and location information to know about their neighbors.
 Each node maintains an observation table to store the neighbor nodes information. This an adversary captures and tampers one or more benign nodes and place them back on the network. These tampered nodes fabricate a set of false identities (FI) and location data (LD).
Using this set, a malicious node launch non-simultaneous Sybil attack as mentioned in any one of the following cases:
Case-1: A malicious node sends out a false identity with correct location data.
Case-2: A malicious node sends out its correct identity with false location data.
Case-3: A malicious node sends out both false identity and false location data.
IV. SYBIL ATTACK DETECTION USING SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS (SADSA)
As showed in Figure 1 , the proposed SADSA method consists of two phases: 1) evidence collection and 2) evidence validation. As allude in section I, nodes in a network has to be categorized as benign or malicious based on some parameters. Such parameters are gathered in the evidence collection phase. 
It means ( , ) become 1 if the difference between two successive time-stamps is less than the maximum beacon period . Otherwise, direct observation becomes 0. In other words, a benign node will always send out a beacon message within . For example, in Figure 2 , there are nine nodes in which node 1 is the malicious node. Node 1 fabricates five Sybil identities.
When node 1 performs non-simultaneous a attack, a false identity will be sent out with each beacon packet during a beacon interval. Neighbors of node 1 receive the beacon with only one identity at a time. Therefore, when malicious nodes perform non-simultaneous a Sybil attack, messages from a Sybil identity may be received in different beacon intervals. Thus, using timestamps, this fact can be identified using Eq. (1).
 Evidence of distance measurement
There are two concepts in distance measurement: signal distance (SD) and Euclidean distance (ED). SD is the distance measured using RSS. In a homogeneous wireless network, nodes can obtain the RSSI of a message received from its neighbor without additional hardware requirements. Further, the distance between a node and its neighbor can be calculated using the radio propagation model as follows
In Eq. 
 Evidence of location verification
A node initiates the location verification when becomes 0 (from Eq. (4)). Localization and location verification are two procedures used to derive and verify the location data.
Localization is the process of deriving a blind node's (i.e., a node which is unaware of its location) location with the help of known locations. Triangulation [22] is a popular method used to obtain the blind node's location data. Location verification is the process of verifying location
claims. There exists several secure location verification algorithms in the literature [18, 19] .
These algorithms work with the help of special verification devices, centralized authorities, relay nodes, etc. It means a node has to verify a location claim with the help of known locations.
Further, algorithms assume that the devices help for location verification is trustworthy.
However, such assumptions do not hold in practice when WSNs are deployed in remote and hostile environments. To this end, the current study presents a simple and efficient location verification process without additional overhead. The key aspect of this is, each node assesses the sincerity in providing the information by its neighbors. This is said to be trust value of neighbors. Then, nodes initiate the triangulation localization process with the location data of two highly trusted nodes and location reported by a malicious node.
 Trust value calculation
Consider a localization scenario shown in In the current work, since D is aware of its location, it requires at least two benign neighbors location to verify the location claim of C. Therefore, calculating the trust value of neighbors helps to identify two benign nodes. To do this, each node maintains two counters to record the success ( ) and failure ( ) of neighbor's information. 
Where, ( ) is the trust value of node . The trust value is 0.5 during the initial stage (i.e., when ( ) = ( ) = 0). It means, each node is trustworthy during the initial stages of the network. However, the trust value increases with respect to the increase in success count and decreases with respect to increase in failure count. A node having trust value greater than or equal to 0.5 is considered as trustworthy. During evidence gathering, if a node observes distinction in the evidences then it initiates the location verification.
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 Location verification
Recall the scenario in Figure 3 , consider that D has identified A, B as highly trusted nodes and it has to verify the location claim of C. At this time, D knows its actual location (AL), location data reported by A, B and C. Now, D estimates its locations (EL) with the help of location data of A, B, and C. The localization process will be carried out as follows [22] :
Consider the general equation of the circle as shown below
From Figure 3 , let ( 1 , 1 ), ( 2 , 2 ), ( 3 , 3 ), and ( , ) be the location data of nodes A, B, C and D respectively, the labels 1 , 2 and 3 respectively on the edges be the estimated distance (using Eq. (2) 
Then, location D( , ) can be calculated using Eq. (6), Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) as follows
The parameters in Eq. (10) is expressed as 
= [ ]
The estimated location (EL) of D is obtained using the following:
Once the EL is calculated, D obtains the evidence of location verification as follows
Where, EL and AL are the estimated location and actual location of the verifying node (i.e., D).
The ( , ) will become 1 if the Euclidean distance between the EL and AL is less than or equal to a localization error threshold ℎ . Otherwise, it becomes 0. We consider ℎ as 0.5 meters. Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of evidence collection and location verification.
Algorithm 1: Evidence collection and location verification in SADSA method Input
Beacon from neighbor node consists of node identity, location data.
Evidences in binary values Start Procedure Step 1
Record the node identity, location data, RSSI of the beacon, Euclidean distance, signal distance and timestamp of the beacon in the neighbor table.
Step 2 Calculate the evidence of direct observation ( ) using Eq. (1) Step 3 Calculate the signal distance using Eq. (2) and Euclidean distance with the reported location data. Then, calculate the evidence of distance measurement ( ) using Eq. (4).
Step 4 If is 0, then increment the ( ) by 1. Otherwise, increment the ( ) by 1.
Step 5 If = 0, then perform the steps 6. Otherwise, set evidence of location verification = 1 and go to step 7.
Step 6 Initiate location verification
Step 6.1 Calculate the trust value of each neighbor using Eq. (5) Step 6.2 Identify two neighbors with the trust value greater than or equal to 0.5.
Step 6.3 Estimate the verification node location using Eq. (14).
Step 6.4 Calculate the evidence of location verification using Eq. (15).
Step 7 Return _ , and . Stop the procedure.
In this way, nodes gather the evidence of direct observation, distance measurement, and location
verification. An adversary may launch Sybil attack in three cases (see Section III (c)): 1) a malicious node sends out a false identity with correct location data (case-1); 2) a malicious node sends out its correct identity with false location data (case-2), and 3) a malicious node sends out both false identity and false location data (case-3). Although each node collects the evidences, the possibility of Sybil attack in the above three cases can be identified only by systematic analysis. To do this, collected evidences are consolidated and then proceeds to the validation phase. The objective of the evidence consolidation is to provide a binary value to the validation phase. The evidences are consolidated as follows Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 1 attacks ( 1 ) using Eq. (16) Step 2 Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 2 attacks ( 2 ) using Eq. (17) Step 3 Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 3 attacks ( 3 ) using Eq. (18) Step 
With this, the success probability ( ) of Bernoulli distribution is defined as = Pr( = 1) = 1 − Pr ( = 0). A node observes similar messages as ~( , ), where ( , ) represents the conditional density over data vector X given the parameter ∈ Θ . Where, Θ denotes the parameter space as Θ = {Θ 0 : , Θ 1 : } with prior density ( ) for on Θ. The prior ( ) with support to Θ for = 0,1 is given as
Where, (. ) takes the value 1 if the given condition is satisfied, otherwise, it takes 0. The marginal density of X with constraints on Θ , for i=0,1 is defined as
With the prior density, the problem of comparing two competing hypothesis can be considered as
Neighbor node is a benign node
Neighbor node is a malicious node
Where, H 0 H 1 are the null and alternative hypotheses respectively. During the hypothesis testing the false positive ( ) and false negative ( ) are defined as follows : False positive error that the decision leads to acceptance of H 1 , when H 0 is true.
: False negative error that the decision leads to acceptance of H 0 , when H 1 is true.
To minimize and values, a large number of samples are required for conventional hypothesis testing. However, using sequential hypothesis testing a decision can be achieved with few samples, and by maintaining desired and values. Since, is the false negative rate, 1 − is the probability of detecting a malicious node. The success probability favors H 0 and the failure probability favors H 1 . The sequential hypothesis testing uses a test static ( ) as the logarithm of ratio of marginal distributions that favor the hypothesis as follows 
Where, 0 = Pr( = 1|H 0 ) , 1 = Pr( = 1|H 1 ), 0 < 1 . Assigning a small value to 0 and a large value to 1 helps the test in detecting malicious nodes accurately [38] . T(X) can be tested by comparing to a non-negative constant threshold (t) such that ( ) ≤ . However, two thresholds are required to remain the T(X) in the decision region as follows
Where, TO is the test output, and are the lower and upper thresholds in which = ( * 1− * ), and = ( 1− * * ) [38] . The terms * and * are the user configured false positive and false negative values. Wall [38] has proved that this test will be terminated with probability one. Nodes compute the test statistic one more time with new evidences if the test statistic remains in between and . Average number of evidences shows the ability of SPRT in accepting a hypothesis with the desired number of false positive and false negative rates.
According to Wald [38] , the expected number of samples required to accept the test is given by
Algorithm 3 shows the evidence validation phase of SADSA method. In the next section, the performance of the proposed method is analyzed using the simulation. Update according to the given input of consolidated evidences using Eq. (19) Step 2 Compute the test statistic T(X) using Eq. (23) Step 3 Identify the decision region using Eq. (24). If ( ) ≤ then accept H0 (null hypothesis) and go to step 4. If ( ) ≥ then accept H1 (alternate hypothesis) and terminate the test. If ≤ ( ) ≤ then go to step 5.
Step 4 Initialize the evidences and stop the procedure.
Step 5 Backup the current value to prepare for next evidences and to compute the test statistic one more time.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
The performance of the proposed SADSA method is analyzed using the network simulator ns-2.35 [43] . The SADSA method is compared against DSANI [24] and RSD [27] methods. This section in sequel presents the simulation setup, results and the discussion, and overhead analysis.
 Simulation setup The results presented in the next section are the average of 50 simulation runs.
 Results and discussion
Scenario 1: Nodes sending out beacon messages with a fixed beacon rate.
This section presents the performance metrics such as the detection rate, error rate, communication overhead, energy consumption and an average number of samples required to accept null and alternate hypothesis is presented. In this scenario, malicious nodes launch case-3 attack that is difficult to detect than case-1 and case-2 attacks. Figure 6 plots the number of malicious nodes versus the number of control packets generated by the network for DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods. It is observed from the graph that the nodes in the network running DSANI method have generated a very high number of control packets as compared to RSD and SADSA methods. It is due to the overhead of preparing the common neighbor set. In the case of RSD method, nodes need to share the neighbor identities having same RSSI values in addition to HELLO packets. Nevertheless, in the SADSA method, unlike DSANI and RSD methods, nodes periodically transmit beacon packets to know their neighbors.
Periodic beacons are most common in WSNs. Therefore, SADSA has low communication overhead as compared to DSANI and RSD methods. Therefore, it can be concluded that SADSA method requires a maximum of four samples to detect a malicious node in all the three cases. Figure 11 : Detection rate of SADSA method when = . and = . Figure 11 plots the number of malicious nodes versus detection rate for SADSA method. It is apparent that the detection rate is above 99% in all the three cases. As the number of malicious nodes is increasing, the detection rate is also increasing. Case-1 attacks are detected accurately across a varying number of malicious nodes. In case-2 and case-3 attacks, the detection rate is higher than 99.6% when there is a maximum number of malicious nodes in the network. Figure 12 plots the number of malicious nodes versus error rate for SADSA method. It is observed that the error rate is below 2% in all the three attack cases. The error rate of case-2 is steadily increased with respect to the increase in the number of malicious nodes. It is because of irregular beacon intervals. SADSA method analyzes the case-3 with identity and location data.
Therefore, the low error rate has been observed for case-3 attacks as compared to case-2 attacks.
Since the false location claims are verified with the help of trusted nodes, the error rate is very close to 0% in the case-3 attacks.
Since the SADSA method considers the consolidated evidences in terms of binary values, the number of evidences required to store in node's memory is directly related to the number of neighbors (n). Each node has to store the consolidated evidence of present and previous observations to compute the test statistic. Therefore, a maximum of two binary values is required for each neighbor to decide a hypothesis. With this, each node has to store a maximum of 2xn bits to run SADSA method. Further, the SADSA method is mostly node-centric. It does not require additional control messages other than beacon messages. Thus, the SADSA method works without additional communication overhead as periodic beaconing is a default communication paradigm to discover neighboring nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
In this paper, a Sybil Attack Detection method using Sequential Analysis (SADSA) is proposed.
It is a node-centric approach to detect the Sybil attacks. This method works in two phases, via, evidence collection and evidence validation. Nodes collect the evidences to reach a decision on detecting malicious nodes. The collected evidences are consolidated and provided as input to the SPRT for validation. The simulation results show that the proposed method has low communication and processing overhead. Further, the simulation study has shown that the SADSA method is robust in detecting Sybil identities with very low false positive and false negative rates. As a future work, we will extend the proposed method to heterogeneous and mobile WSNs.
